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Environmental Crimes:
The Boom in "Busting" Corporations and
Their Responsible Officers
Larry Howellt
Nothing so upholds the laws as the punishment of persons whose
rank is as great as their crime.
-- Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642)
Chief Minister of France under Louis XI
I. Introduction
Critics of the last decade's seemingly exponential increase in criminal
prosecutions under federal environmental laws should replace John
Pozsgai, the current "poster child" for their cause, with the unfortunate
polluter of whom the King of England made an example nearly 700
years ago. After all, John Pozsgai, a Hungarian immigrant whose "crime,"
according to the conservative Washington Legal Foundation (WLF),
consisted of nothing more than cleaning up an old dump site on land
he had bought and replacing the refuse with clean fill, only received
three years in prison and a $202,000 fine for violating the wetland
protection provisions of the Clean Water Act.' The unidentified English-
man, on the other hand, was executed in 1307 for violating a royal
proclamation barring the burning of coal in an already smoggy London.2
Besides, try as they might to portray Mr. Pozsgai as the victim of
an environmental inquisition-and under the Bush Administration, no
t BA. (1980), Colorado State University; MA. (1988), University of Montana; JD. (1992),
University of Montana.
1. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 781, 784-85 (1991); see also James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal
Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 916, 923-24 (1991).
2. Andrew S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 MASS. L.
REV. 112 (1990).
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less 3 -the groups that have seized his case4 to support their cause have
been unable to explain away the fact that Mr. Pozsgai continued to fill
in the wetlands despite receiving eight warnings that he needed a permit.
Those warnings included not only notices of violation along with cease
and desist orders from the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), but a restraining order from a federal district judge.5 While
no one knows whether the coal-burning Londoner appreciated the
seriousness of his crime, it seems likely that, due process being what
it was in the Middle Ages, any notices he received numbered fewer
than eight. In short, this anonymous Englishman, who probably was
only trying to keep his family warm, makes a much more dramatic symbol
of the environmental persecution feared by conservatives than does a
scofflaw such as John Pozsgai.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the political perspective of
groups such as the WLF, no one can dispute the fact that more environ-
mental violators, including corporate executives with no direct responsibil-
ities for ensuring environmental compliance, can expect to hear prison
doors shut behind them. Capital punishment, though, is at least a few
years away. After detailing the recent increase in environmental prosecu-
tions, this Article discusses the criminal provisions of the major federal
environmental acts and discusses recent legislative efforts to strengthen
those provisions even further. Those efforts include the addition of
"knowing endangerment" violations, the adoption of sentencing guidelines
for environmental crimes and corporate offenders, the passage of the
Criminal Fine Improvements Act and the Pollution Prosecution Act,
and the, as yet, unsuccessful attempts to pass the Environmental Crimes
Act. Finally, this Article examines the recent trend that the regulated
community finds the most troubling: Prosecutors' largely successful
efforts to extend the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine, which
arose under strict liability misdemeanor statutes, to felony environmental
statutes requiring a violator in most instances to act knowingly.
3. See Howard Kurtz, EPA Accused of Muddying its 'Jackboots' in Pennsylvania Wetlands,
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1990, at A3.
4. United States v. Pozsgai No. 88-00450-01 (ED. Pa. July 13, 1989), aff d mem. 897
F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 48 (1990), sentence reduction denied, 757 F. Supp.
21 (ED. Pa.), and aff'd in part, 947 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1991).
5. Adler & Lord, supra note 1, at 785.
[Vol 16:417
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H. Strengthening Criminal Penalties in
Federal Environmental Laws
Despite the fact that for the last twelve years the executive branch
has been dominated by conservative Republican appointees, the number
of prosecutions for violations of federal environmental laws has increased
greatly. As one high-level Reagan appointee stated, "It has been, and
will continue to be, Justice Department policy to conduct environmental
criminal investigations with an eye toward identifying, prosecuting, and
convicting the highest ranking, truly responsible corporate officials."'
Department of Justice (DOJ) statistics indicate that its announced
policy has succeeded quite well.7 Between 1982 (when the DOJ estab-
lished its Environmental Crimes Unit) and the end of 1990 (by which
time the unit had expanded into the much larger Environmental Crimes
Section), federal environmental prosecutors obtained 703 indictments
and 517 convictions! Those convictions resulted in the assessment
of more than $56 million in fines, restitution and forfeitures, as well
as the imposition of more than 316 years imprisonment. 9 One-third
of those indictments (234) and three-quarters of the fines, restitution
and forfeitures ($43 million) came in fiscal years 1989 and 1990.10
In 1990 alone, the DOJ obtained 134 indictments, a 33% rise over the
6. F. Hemy Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 ENvTiL L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10478, 10480 (1987).
However, some high level EPA officials recently took the rare step of criticizing the Justice
Department's lenient handling of several criminal investigations of corporations and their officers.
See Sharon LaFraniere, EPA Officials Criticize Justice Dept., WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1992,
at A4.
7. Generally, the DOJ handles criminal prosecutions rather than the EPA. For a good
explanation of the respective roles of the two agencies in criminal cases, see Judson W. Starr,
Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions
and the Work that Remains, 59 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 900 (1991); see also Adler & Lord, supra
note 1; Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal
Liability for Violations of Environmental Statutes in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVL L. 201
(1991). For an account of how the EPA and the DOJ sometimes do not see eye-to-eye on
particular cases, see LaFraniere, supra note 6.
8. Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaws-A National Priority,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 775,778 (1991). Mr. Thornburgh was Attorney General of the United
States when he wrote this article.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 778 n.19.
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previous year." Furthermore, of the 134 indictments in 1990, the DOJ
claims that an astonishing 98% of the indictments named corporations
responsible as well as their owners, officers, or managers.'
Recent news accounts suggest the pace has yet to slacken, at least
as far as fines are concerned. On March 26, 1992, the DOJ announced
that Rockwell International Corporation had agreed to plead guilty to
five felonies and five misdemeanors in connection with hazardous waste
violations at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant near Denver,
Colorado. 5 Rockwell, which runs Rocky Flats for the United States
Department of Energy, agreed to pay a fine of $18.5 million, the second
largest fine ever assessed for environmental crimes. 4 The largest fine
came last year when Exxon agreed to pay $125 million to settle the
criminal charges that arose out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.' s In just
two cases in the last two years, the DOJ almost tripled the total dollar
amount in fines for the previous nine years combined.
While the Reagan and Bush administrations might like to take much
of the credit, this dramatic increase in environmental prosecutions is
largely attributable to Congress upgrading the status of many environmen-
tal crimes from misdemeanors to felonies, which in turn resulted in
increased emphasis by the EPA and the DOJ on the use of criminal
sanctions instead of civil proceedings." Of the major federal environ-
mental laws in existence two decades ago, not one contained felony
provisions. However, since the enactment of the 1990 amendments
to the Clean Air Act, all environmental laws now contain such provi-
sions. 7  Because of the complexity of investigating and litigating
environmental cases, Congress upgraded misdemeanors to felonies in
order to "justify the considerable resources" needed to prosecute such
11. Id. at 778 n.20.
12. Id. at 778 n.21.
13. Nuclear Energy: Rockwell Pleads Guilty for Rocky Flats, Agrees to Pay $18.5 Million
Penaly, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 60, at A-33 (March 27, 1992) [hereinafter
Rockwell Pleads Guilty].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Richard J. Leon, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Mushrooming Cloud, 63
ST. JoHN's L REv. 679, 682 (1989).
17. Thomburgh, supra note 8, at 776-77 n.3.
[Vol. 16:417
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cases.18 Congress's decision to increase the penalties resulted from
a widespread belief that many businesses had come to view civil sanctions
as simply a cost of doing business--one that could be passed on to
consumers regardless of the amount." This perception was realized
after Exxon's highest officer commented on his corporation's agreement
to pay approximately $1.2 billion to the Alaskan and federal governments
over ten years to settle the criminal and civil charges resulting from
the Exxon Valdez supertanker's encounter with Bligh reef. When asked
about the settlement's impact on Exxon, Chairman Lawrence G. Rawl,
according to the New York Times, suggested the effects would be
minimal. "'We're talking about stretching a bill out over [ten] years.....
It will not curtail any of our plans.' 20 One is left to wonder whether
Exxon's behavior will change as a result.
A. Criminal Provisions of Major Environmental Acts
The major federal environmental acts providing for criminal prosecu-
tions2 1 are the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, better known as
the Clean Water Act (CWA);22 the Clean Air Act (CAA); 3 the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA);24 the Solid Waste Disposal Act, better
known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA);25
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
18. Leon, supra note 16, at 682.
19. Strock, supra note 1, at 916.
20. Adler & Lord, supra note 1, at 784 (quoting Keith Schneider, $1.1 Billion for Valdez
Oil Spill: A Bargain?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, sec. 4, at 5).
21. Some of the shorthand descriptions of the criminal provisions of these statutes are
paraphrased from R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and
the Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 314-18 (1991).
22. Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992)).
23. Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992)).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
2601-2671 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992)).
25. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Star. 997 (1965) (codified as amended and revised at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1992)).
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Act (CERCLA);26 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FFRA)l7
1. Clean Water Act
Under the CWA, the contamination of a body of water with virtually
any pollutant without having a permit to do so, or in violation of a permit
condition or other limitation, is considered a crime. Negligent viola-
tions are punishable by fines ranging from $2,500 to $25,000 per day
and by up to a year in prison.29 Knowing violations are punishable
by fines of $5,000 to $50,000 per day and by up .to three years in
prison.'" For second or subsequent convictions, the fines and imprison-
ment for both negligent and knowing violations double. The CWA also
provides for harsher sentences for "knowing endangerment" violations,
which occur when someone knowingly violates the Act with the actual
knowledge that doing so "places another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury."'' Such violations are punishable
by up to fifteen years in prison and fines of $250,000 for individuals
and $1 million for organizations. 32 False statements under the CWA
are punishable by up to two years in prison and a $10,000 fine.'
2. Clean Air Act
The CAA parallels closely the CWA in the structure of its criminal
provisions, in that it also has four types of violations: negligent, knowing,
knowing endangerment, and false statements.3 Prohibited acts include
26. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992)).
27. Ch. 121, 61 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 6-136 y (West 1980
& Supp. 1992)).
28. 33 U.S.C.A. I 1319(c) (West Supp. 1992).
29. Id. § 1319(cXl).
30. Id. § 1319(cX2).
31. Id. § 1319(cX3)(A).
32. Id.
33. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(cX4) (West Supp. 1992).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 16:417
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violating any implementation plan and releasing hazardous air pollutants
into the ambient air. The CAA defers to Title 18 of the United States
Code on the range of fines available for individual violators." The
possible prison sentences are also the same as in the CWA, except that
knowing violators face up to five years instead of three."
3. Toxic Substances Control Act
Under TSCA a crime occurs when one knowingly or willfully fails
to comply with any order issued under TSCA concerning the manufacture
or testing of chemical substances, uses for commercial purposes a
chemical substance that was manufactured or distributed in violation
of the TSCA, violates the required record-keeping provisions of TSCA,
or fails to permit entry or inspection as the Act requires.' Criminal
violations are punishable by up to a $25,000 fine for each day of violation
and a year in prison."
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RCRA, one of the more heavily enforced acts by environmental
prosecutors, was designed to provide "cradle to grave" record keeping
on the generation, storage, transportation, handling, and disposal of
hazardous waste." No negligent criminal violations exist under RCRA,
only knowing ones. Among other things, RCRA considers the following
to be crimes: (1) to knowingly transport hazardous waste to an unlicensed
facility; (2) to knowingly treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste
either without a permit or in knowing violation of the material conditions
of any permit or standards; (3) to knowingly omit material information
or make false statements in any required record, (4) to knowingly
generate, store, treat, dispose of, or otherwise handle any hazardous
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 74 13(cXl) (West Supp. 1992).
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615(b) (West 1982).
38. Id.
39. Robert G. Morvillo, Policing the Environment, N.Y. L. J., April 7,1992, at 3. (quoting
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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waste while knowingly failing to keep and file the proper documentation;
(5) to knowingly transport or cause to be transported any hazardous
waste without a manifest; and (6) to knowingly export any hazardous
waste without the receiving country's consent or in violation of any
international agreement.4" Fines under RCRA can be up to $50,000
per day and jail terms generally can be up to five years, except in some
cases where the maximum is two years.41 As in the CWA, violations
of the knowing endangerment provisions are punishable by up to fifteen
years in prison and fines of $250,000 for individuals and $1 million
for organizations.
5. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
FIFRA provides for the registering, the labelling, and the testing of
pesticides. Knowing violations of any of the Act's provisions by pesticide
producers are punishable by up to a year in prison and a $50,000 fine. 42
Knowing violations by commercial applicators are punishable up to
a year in prison and a $25,000 fine." Knowing violations by a private
applicator are punishable up to 30 days in jail and a $1,000 fine."4
6. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
Under CERCLA, which was enacted to identify and clean up sites
contaminated with hazardous substances, a person who knowingly falsifies
or destroys any required record, or who is in charge of a facility and
fails to report a spill of which he is aware, or who files a false claim
for reimbursement from the Superfund can be punished by up to three
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (Supp. 1992). Section MI of this Article examines in detail
how the DOJ and the courts have construed the knowledge requirement of RCRA's criminal
provisions.
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(dX7) (West Supp. 1992).
42. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1361(bXl)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
43. Id. § 1361(bXl)(B).
44. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1361(bX2) (West 1980).
[Vol. 16:417
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years (five years on a second conviction) and fined, pursuant to Title
18.4
s
B. Knowing Endangerment Violations
As noted earlier, most of the felony provisions of these statutes were
added after the initial passage of the various acts. The most recent
addition to the criminal provisions is the serious crime of knowingly
endangering another person, included in RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA.
RCRA's knowing endangerment provision, for example, states that "[a]ny
person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports
any hazardous waste.. . who knows at that time that he thereby places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury"
faces up to fifteen years in prison and a $250,000 fine."6 Organizations
convicted under this provision can be fined up to $1 million.47
If the offender is a natural person, the statute limits its application
to situations in which the offender had actual awareness or belief that
his action placed another in risk of serious bodily injury, but allows
the use of circumstantial evidence to establish that knowledge, "including
evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to shield himself from
relevant information."" A defendant has the requisite knowledge "if
he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to cause
danger of death or serious bodily injury."
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding RCRA's knowing endangerment
provision against a challenge that it was void for vagueness, succinctly
summarized the essence of a knowing endangerment violation.50 The
defendant, Protex Industries, recycled barrels and drums used to store
chemicals. Protex was convicted of knowingly endangering its employees,
several of whom suffered from solvent poisoning due to lack of protective
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(dX2) (West Supp. 1992).
46. Id. § 6928(e).
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(f)(2)(B) (West 1983).
49. Id. § 6928(fX1)(C).
50. United States v. Protex Indus., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
19921
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equipmenL- On appeal, Protex challenged the statute as vague on
its face and as applied, but the court of appeals disagreed, stating, "The
gist of the 'knowing endangerment' provision of the RCRA is that a
party will be criminally liable if, in violating other provisions of the
RCRA, it places others in danger of great harm and it has knowledge
of that danger.4
2
C. Impact of Sentencing Guidelines
Another major change that illustrates the increased importance attached
to the prosecution of environmental crimes is the inclusion of a separate
section on these crimes in the complicated Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manual. 3 This manual is in effect for all federal crimes committed
after November 1, 1987. As widely discussed in connection with other
crimes, these guidelines eliminate much of the judicial discretion involved
in sentencing, abolish parole altogether, and restrict suspended sentences
to the least serious offenses. Perhaps in no area of criminal law will
the increase in sentences under the guidelines be felt more harshly than
in environmental violations. Where pre-guideline defendants routinely
received suspended sentences, post-guideline defendants will just as
routinely go to prison."
Under the new sentencing guidelines, it is difficult to predict a jail
sentence with absolute certainty unless all the sentencing materials and
facts are available. One fact, however, that can be stated with complete
certainty is that many people convicted for environmental offenses are
now going to be sentenced to jail. The question is no longer whether
a defendant in environmental cases will go to prison, but rather for how
long."
51. Id. at 741-42.
52. Id. at 744.
53. FEDERAL SENTC IcNG GuiDELINzs MANUAL §§ 2Q1.1 to 2Q2.1 (1992) [hereinafter
GumnuELs MANUAL].
54. See Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing
Guidelines: The Time Has Come... and It Is Hard Time, 20 ENV7iL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10096, 10099-10100 (1990).
55. Id.
[Vol 16:417
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The guidelines establish three categories of environmental violations
that cover most offenses within the major environmental acts: knowing
endangerment," mishandling hazardous or toxic substances or pesti-
cides,57 and mishandling other pollutants.m For each category, a "base
offense level" is assigned, followed by a list of "specific offense character-
istics" that either add or subtract points from the base offense level to
reach a defendant's point level. The sentence imposed is determined
within a narrow range for that point level taking into account the
defendant's criminal history. For example, the base offense level for
mishandling hazardous or toxic substances is eight,5 9 but that level
is quickly increased by six if the offense resulted in an ongoing discharge
of the substance." If the offense resulted in the substantial likelihood
of death or serious injury, another nine points is added.6 ' But if the
offense involved is merely a record keeping violation, two points are
subtracted.62 Additionally, other sections of the guidelines concerning
the defendant's role in the violation also apply. For instance, if the
person involved is a ring leader, organizer, supervisor or manager, another
two to four points could be added to the offense level.63 Perhaps the
most important factor to consider about the guidelines is that for a first
offender any offense level above six requires incarceration."
The impact of the guidelines is best illustrated by comparing what
a pre-guidelines defendant in an actual case received to what he would
receive under the guidelines. In United States v. Hoflin,'5 the former
director of Public Works for the City of Ocean Shores, Washington,
was convicted of directing an employee to illegally bury drums of paint
56. GuIDELnS MANuAL, supra note 53, § 2Ql.1.
57. Id. § 2Q1.2.
58. Id. § 2Q1.3.
59. Id. § 2Q1.2(a).
60. Id. § 2Q1.2(bXl)(A).
61. GUIDEL iES MANuAL, supra note 53, § 2Q1.2(b)(2).
62. Id. § 2Q1.2(bX6).
63. Id. § 3B1.1.
64. Id. § 5Bl.1(a)(1).
65. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); see infra text
accompanying notes 111-37 for its holding on RCRA's knowledge requirement.
1992]
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waste, in violation of RCRA, and of illegally disposing of grease, in
violation of the CWA. He was placed on probation for two years. Had
the offenses occurred after November 1, 1987, the result would have
been notably different. Because the RCRA violation involved mishandling
of a hazardous substance, Hoflin's base offense level would be eight."
The violation would be increased by four levels because an actual release
of the substance occurred.6' In addition, four more levels would be
added because Hoflin disposed of the substance without a permit.
As director of public works, Hoflin also would almost certainly face
another increase of at least two levels for his position of authority.0
Therefore, his offense level would have been at least 18, which requires
27 to 33 months in prison. 0 Additionally, at the time, the CWA
violations were misdemeanors and thus not considered aggravating factors
during sentencing. Now, however, that violation is also a felony and
could result in an additional increase in Hoflin's sentence."' The
guidelines also require the sentencing judge to impose a fine unless
the defendant cannot pay it or it would severely impact his dependents.7
An offense level of 16, for example, requires a fine of at least $5,000
and not more than $50,000.73
D. The Criminal Fine Improvements Act
Organizations, including corporations, that violate environmental
laws are expressly excluded from the sentencing guidelines provisions
for determining how much an organization should be fined. 74 Instead,
environmental violations by corporations are subject to fines in accord
with Title 18 of the United States Code, which gives judges considerably
66. GuDDELS MANUAL, supra note 53, § 2Q1.2(a).
67. Id. § 2Q1.2(bX1)(B).
68. Id. § 2Q1.2(bX4).
69. Id. § 3B1.1(c).
70. Id. § 5A.
71. Starr & Kelly, supra note 54, at 10099.
72. Id. at 10100
73. Id.
74. GurDazi MANAiL, supra note 53, § 8C2.1.
[Vol. 16:417
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more latitude than the sentencing guidelines. The key provisions
regarding the amount of such fines are contained in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571,
which was enacted as part of the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of
1987.75 This Act provides that an organizational defendant can be
fined an amount greater than the maximum allowed by the specific statute
the organization has violated, unless that statute expressly exempts the
offense from being included under the Criminal Fine Improvement Act.7'
The Act instead allows a corporation to be fined the greater of:
$500,000 for felony convictions; $200,000 for Class A misdemeanor
convictions, the maximum set by the statute violated; or twice the amount
of any person's pecuniary gain or loss from the offense." The last
method of calculating fines has the greatest potential impact on corporate
environmental violators, given the great expense of cleaning up environ-
mental disasters. While few corporations have been sentenced to date
under this law for environmental violations, one cannot help but wonder
what effect it might have had on the willingness of Exxon and Rockwell
International to settle the criminal cases against them for $125 million
and $18.5 million, respectively.'
E. The Pollution Prosecution Act
Another piece of recent legislation that will no doubt lead to even
more prosecutions of environmental crimes is the Pollution Prosecution
Act of 1990.7 In 1988-89, the EPA had only sixty criminal investiga-
tors, known as special agents, compared to two thousand for the Secret
Service, three thousand for the IRS, and over nine thousand for the
FBI.80 Recognizing that this shortage severely hampered the EPA's
ability to conduct criminal investigations, the Pollution Prosecution Act
75. Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571 (West
Supp. 1992)).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(c) (West Supp. 1992).
77. Id.
78. See Rockwell Pleads Guilty, supra note 13.
79. Pub. L. No. 101-593, §§ 201-05, 104 Stat. 2954, 2962-63 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4321 note (West Supp. 1992)).
80. Leon. supra note 16, at 685.
1992]
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requires the EPA to boost its number of special agents to two hundred
by October 1, 1995.81 Obviously, more than tripling the EPA's number
of criminal investigators should dramatically increase the, number of
cases it refers to the DOJ for prosecution.' The same Act also creates
a national center to train federal, state and local investigators, prosecutors,
and technical experts in the enforcement of federal environmental laws.3
To fund these requirements, Congress appropriated an additional $110
million over five years.U
F. The Proposed Environmental Crimes Act
In the wake of Exxon's befouling of Alaska's once-pristine Prince
William Sound and the perceived inadequacy of environmental laws
to adequately punish such massive environmental catastrophes, members
of the House of Representatives first proposed the Environmental Crimes
Act of 1989. The bill, which never made it out of the House during
the 101st Congress,8 was reintroduced in the 102d Congress during
the summer of 1991 as Senate Bill 1605.81 This bill likewise never'
made it out of the House. The bill created two new felonies punishable
by up to 30 years in prison and maximum fines of $500,000 for individu-
als and $2 million for organizations.8'
81. Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 202(aX5), 104 Stat. 2954, 2962 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
4321 note (West Supp. 1992)).
82. The FBI has increasingly focused on environmental crimes, as shown by the joint
FBI-EPA investigation of the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility outside Denver. In June
1989, 120 agents, mostly from the FBI, raided the facility with handguns drawn, seizing boxes
of records and taking photographs. This joint investigation resulted in a plea bargain with
Rockwell. Rockwell Pleads Guilty, supra note 13; Strock, supra note 1, at 934.
83. Pub. L. No. 101-593, 1 204, 104 Stat. 2954, 2963 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
note (West Supp. 1992)).
84. Id. 1205.
85. I-LR. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
86. Adler & Lord, supra note 1, at 818-19.
87. See 137 CONG. REC. S11572 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Wofford).
88. S. 1605, 102dCong., lstSess.(1991). Thebill would have added sections 731 through
735 to Title 18 of the United States Code. Notes 89 through 94 refer to those proposed sections.
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The first new felony prohibited "knowingly or recklessly endangering
life or causing an environmental catastrophe.'49 "Environmental catastro-
phe" is defined as "death or injury to 20 percent or more of the known
population of any species of fish, wildlife, or plant within a defined
ecosystem; or... destruction of habitat or any species of fish, wildlife,
plant, or other living natural resource that prohibits the ability of the
habitat to support viable breeding of the affected species."' The second
new felony prohibited "endangering life or causing environmental
catastrophe by a course of illegal conduct,"'91 with the key phrase "course
of illegal conduct" defined as two or more environmental offenses that
contribute to the risk of imminent death, serious bodily injury or environ-
mental catastrophe. 92 The act also provided for a lesser offense of
negligently endangering life or causing environmental catastrophe,
punishable by up to one year in jail and fines of $125,000 for individuals
and $500,000 for corporations."
Another significant feature of the act required the sentencing court,
upon conviction of an organization for any environmental felony, to
appoint an independent expert to conduct an environmental audit aimed
at determining the cause of the violation and of determining what steps
should be taken to prevent future occurrences.
IM Extending the "Responsible Corporate Officer"
Doctrine to Environmental Statutes
Because virtually all felony creims under the major environmental
acts require that a violator act with knowledge," it is hardly surprising
that much of the battle in environmental prosecutions focuses on the
question of exactly what the defendant had to have known. Unfortunately
for corporate officials, the answer from the courts tends to be "very
89. S. 1605, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 731 (1991).
90. Id. § 735(1).
91. Id. § 732.
92. Id. I 731(c).
93. Id. § 733.
94. S. 1605, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 734 (1991).
95. See text Section Hl, parts A & B.
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little." Even those courts that have required a more rigorous amount
of knowledge have virtually negated the requirement by allowing juries
to infer the requisite knowledge from the defendant's position of responsi-
bility. Allowing juries to infer knowledge from a defendant's position
within a corporation is an expansion of the "responsible corporate officer"
(RCO) doctrine. The RCO doctrine previously had been restricted to
strict liability "public welfare" statutes that only provided for misdemeanor
violations.96 Together, these two developments have struck fear-some
would say hysteria-into the hearts of corporate executives and their
highly paid counsel.'
A. Court Interpretations of RCRA's
Knowledge Requirement
Nowhere has the knowledge requirement been litigated more heavily
than under the knowing violations of RCRA's restrictions on the handling
of hazardous wastes."6 The two key felony provisions of RCRA criminal-
ize the conduct of any person who:
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous
waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does
not have a permit .... [or]
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit ... ; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement
of such permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement
of any applicable interim status regulations or standards."
96. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975);
United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S. CL 134, 88 L. Ed. 48, reh'g denied, 320 U.S.
815 (1943).
97. For opposing views on the legitimacy of the panic among corporate officials over
their expanding criminal liability, compare Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives
on the Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59
GEo. WASiL L. REv. 862 (1991), with Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The ResponsibleCorporate Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt
You, 22 FNvm. L. REP. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10099 (1992).
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West Supp. 1992).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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Courts have had to construe both subsections (1) and (2) to determine
what the defendant had to know in order to be convicted. While the
ve'dict is not unanimous, the majority rule-and, perhaps more important-
ly, the obvious trend-is that a defendant need only have a bare minimum
of knowledge, sometimes as little as an awareness of the incident charged
and that it involved a potentially harmful substance.uo The defendant
generally does not have to know that the act in question was illegal
or that the substance involved was specifically listed as a hazardous
waste by the statutes.101
As discussed below, however, the circuit courts are divided on what
a guilty defendant had to know about RCRA's permit requirements.
The three circuits that have considered the issue now agree that, under
section 6928(d)(1), the prosecution must prove both that the defendant
knowingly transported hazardous waste and that the defendant knew
the receiving facility lacked a permit to treat, store or dispose of the
waste. The second knowledge requirement, concerning the receiving
facility's permit status, seemingly runs counter to a similar issue the
majority of circuits have decided. Under section 6928(d)(2)(A), a waste
generator defendant must only know that he or his facility lacked a permit
to treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste. A further indication of
the uncertainty surrounding this area is that the most recent circuit to
consider this knowledge requirement of section 6928(d)(1) first concluded
that a conviction does not require proof that a waste generator defendant
knew the permit status of the receiving facility in question. The court
then withdrew that opinion and replaced it with one coming to the
opposite conclusion.
1 0 2
In 1984, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed for the first
time the question of RCRA's knowledge requirements in United States
v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.1°3 In Johnson & Towers, a company and
two employees were indicted for illegally dumping hazardous waste
without a permit, in violation of section 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA. While
the company admitted its guilt, the employees filed motions to dismiss
100. Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 97, at 10102.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
1M)2
HeinOnline  -- 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 433 1992-1993
AmmwPCAN JouRNAL OF TIiAL ADVOCACY
alleging that only owners or operators could be convicted of dumping
without a permit because they were the only persons RCRA required
to get permits for the corporation.'O4 The district court agreed and
granted the motion to dismiss on RCRA charges.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 6928(d)(2)(A)
forbids owners and operators of the facilities, as well as their employees,
from disposing of hazardous substances without a permit.'" However,
the court also held that because the employees were not required to
obtain a permit, the Government had to establish that they "knew or
should have known that there had been no compliance with the permit
requirement of section 6925.'" 1 Thus, the Third Circuit interpreted
subsection (2)(A) of section 6928(d) to read the same as subsections
(2)(B) & (C), which expressly require that a person knowingly violate
the conditions of a permit or other regulation, even though subsection
(A) contained no such express requirement. In effect, the court held
that "knowingly" applied to each element of the violation." The
Third Circuit is the only circuit court to hold in such a way on this issue.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Hoflin,'" next faced the
question of whether a defendant charged, under section 6928(d)(2)(A),
with knowingly disposing of hazardous waste without a permit had to
know that a permit was required. Using sound statutory analysis, the
court rejected the conclusion of the Johnson & Towers court, stating:
Had Congress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit to be an
element under subsection (A) it easily could have said so. It specifically
inserted a knowledge element in subsection (B), and it did so notwith-
standing the "knowingly" modifier which introduces subsection (2).
In the face of such obvious congressional action we will not write
something into the statute which Congress so plainly left out. ... To
adopt the Third Circuit's interpretation of subsection (A) would render
the word "knowing" in subsection (B) mere surplusage. 1'"
104. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 664-65.
107. Id. at 668.
108. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
109. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038.
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Due in part, no doubt, to the Ninth Circuit's strong reasoning,'"
at least one, and possibly two other circuit courts faced with deciding
how far the word "knowingly" extends in section 6928(d)(2)(A) have
chosen to follow Hoflin rather than Johnson & Towers. In United States
v. Dean,"' the Sixth Circuit discussed the reasoning of the two cases
at length in explaining that Hoflin was preferred, largely because of
the ramifications for the RCRA's regulatory scheme if ignorance of
the permit requirement was a defense to permit violations.
The Ninth Circuit observed that the permit requirement is intended to
give the EPA notice that oversight of a facility is necessary (and, by
implication, the force of the statutory scheme would be greatly diminished
by exempting all who claimed ignorance of the statute's requirements).
The difference in mens rea between the subsections [of section
6928(d)(2)] signifies the relative importance, in the estimation of
Congress, of the twin requirements of obtaining a permit and complying
with the permit. This ranking is consistent with the greater likelihood
that compliance with the permit will be monitored.lu,
The Fifth Circuit may possibly align itself with the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits on this issue, making the split three to one in favor of not
requiring the prosecution to prove that a defendant charged under section
6928(d)(2)(A) knew that he was required to have a permit to handle
hazardous wastes. In United States v. Baytank,lU the court did not
discuss this precise issue but did set out the elements necessary to convict
a defendant under section 6928(d)(2)(A). The elements are "that the
defendant knows factually what he is doing-storing, what is being stored,
and that what is being stored factually has the potential for harm to
others or the environment, and that he has no permit.""4 Assuming
the court chose its language carefully (often a dangerous assumption),
110. See United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957, 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the
analysis of the Johnson & Towers court, choosing instead to adopt Hoflin because it was
"consistent with the general principles of statutory interpretation which have developed in the
context of 'public welfare' offenses").
111. 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992).
112. Dean, 969 F.2d at 191.
113. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
114. Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
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even concerning those elements that were not being challenged, a plain
reading of this language is that a defendant is only required to know
that he did not have a permit, which is considerably less than knowing
he needed a permit.
While most circuit courts that have considered this issue have
concluded that under section 6928(d)(2)(A) a defendant need not know
that he needed a permit to handle hazardous wastes, those that have
construed the nearly identical knowledge provision of section 6928(d)(1)
have unanimously come to the opposite conclusion. The Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Hayes International Corp.,1 s first concluded
that section 6928(d)(1) required the prosecution to prove that a defendant
knew that the facility to which he transported hazardous waste lacked
a permit. Unfortunately, the opinion's logic breaks down at a key point.
In Hayes International, a company and one employee were convicted
under section 6928(d)(1) of knowingly transporting hazardous waste
for disposal to a facility that lacked a permit. The trial court granted
j.n.o.v. holding that in addition to knowingly transporting the waste
the defendants had to know that the facility that took the waste did not
have the required permits. In a confusing opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
reinstated the guilty verdicts, holding that while RCRA did not require
that the defendants know that a disposal facility needed a permit, the
law did require that the defendants know that the disposal facility lacked
a permit1 1 The court tried to explain this self-described "anomalous"
holding via a less than helpful analogy to securities law: "[A] seller
need not know a license is required to sell a security as long as the seller
knows he does not have a permit. 1 1
7
The analogy in Hayes International, however, does not work. Hayes
International concerned what a person must know about a third party's
permit status, whereas a security dealer need only know his own permit
status. Requiring the prosecution to prove that a defendant knew he
did not have a permit is much less onerous than requiring the prosecution
to prove that the defendant knew another party was not licensed. If
the purpose of section 6928(d)(1) is to prevent a waste generator from
115. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
116. Hayes In'l, 786 F.2d at 1504.
117. Id. at 1504 n.6.
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transferring waste to an unlicensed facility, which seems undisputable,
requiring the generator to know the facility lacked a permit in order
to be found guilty defeats that purpose. Instead, the waste generator
should be put on inquiry notice. Thus, if a generator fails to inquire
as to a hazardous waste facility's license status and the facility lacks
a license, the generator should be guilty under RCRA.
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,'" the
First Circuit concurred with the conclusion of Hayes International,
although that portion of MacDonald & Watson is dicta. Citing Hayes
International approvingly, the First Circuit found "much to be said"
for requiring the Government to prove that a defendant charged with
shipping a hazardous waste to a facility lacking a permit knew the
facility's permit status or was at least "willfully indifferent" to the lack
of a permitL..
Recently, in a two-to-one opinion, another circuit court followed
suit but in a manner that clearly reflects the strong debate surrounding
this issue. In United States v. Speach," the Ninth Circuit rejected
the Government's logical contention that the same court's earlier decision
in Hoflin, concerning the knowledge requirement of section 6928(d)(2)(A),
required a similar finding under the similar language of section
6928(d)(1)." The court distinguished Hoflin on two grounds, the
first of which, and by far the weaker of the two, was that Congress may
have unwittingly neglected to put the word "knowingly" into the statute
everywhere it was intended, an assumption that the dissent points out
the court dismissed in Hoflin when it interpreted section
6928(d)(2)(A). m  The court's second, and more sound reason for
distinguishing Hoflin is that section 6928(d)(1) concerns what a defendant
knew about a third person's permit status, while (d)(2)(A) concerns
the defendant's own permit status.Am The court adopted the reasoning
in Hayes International that "[r]emoving the knowledge requirement
118. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
119. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 47-48.
120. 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992).
121. Speach, 968 F.2d at 797.
122. Id. at 798 (Rymer, I, dissenting).
123. Id. at 797.
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[of section 6928(d)(1)] would criminalize innocent conduct, such as
that of a transporter who relied in good faith upon a recipient's fraudulent
certificate."' 4 However, as the dissent also points out, that reasoning
ignores the fact that "reading the statute literally here, as in Hoflin, is
consistent with RCRA's purpose of protecting people and the environment
from hazardous waste.' ' 25
Furthermore, the court's concerns about a waste generating defendant
being prosecuted for his "good faith" reliance upon a waste facility's
fraudulent assertions ignores the ease with which a waste generator can
determine whether a receiving facility has the required permit A phone
call to the appropriate agency-either the EPA, or more typically, a
state's environmental regulatory agency-will readily determine whether
a facility has the appropriate license. Given the highly regulated nature
of hazardous waste handling and the potential risk, both environmental
and legal, requiring waste generators to make such a phone call or face
the consequences seems a minimal burden to impose. As the United
States Supreme Court unequivocally stated in rejecting ignorance as
a defense to charges of violating Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations governing transportation of hazardous liquids, that when
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation."''
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Speach-because of the light
it sheds on how unsettled this question may still be despite the appearance
of unanimity among the circuits--is that the opinion initially rejected
the reasoning in Hayes International.Y Instead, the Ninth Circuit
first chose, as one might expect, to follow its own analysis in Hoflin,
concluding that, under section 6928(d)(2)(A), a waste generator defendant
124. Id. at 796.
125. Id. at 798 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
126. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565, 91 S. Ct.
1697, 1701-02, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178, 183 (1971).
127. No. 90-50708, 1992 WL 51181 (9th Cir. March 20, 1992) (opinion withdrawn, May
11, 1992). reissued at 968 F.2d 795 (1992).
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need not know anything about the receiving facility's permit status to
be convicted.
We are bound in this case to follow our own precedent as established
in Hoflin. The word "knowingly" is used in exactly the same manner
in both [section] 6928(d)(1) and [section] 6928(d)(2XA). The word
"knowingly" in [section] 6928(d)(2)(A) modifies "treats, stores, or
disposes of any hazardous waste," but does not modify "without a
permit." The language of [section] 6928(d)(1) is parallel to that of
[section] 6928(dX2)(A), and the word "knowingly" in [section] 6928(d)(1)
only modifies "transports or causes to be transported any hazardous
waste."'
Even more perplexing, given the court's change of mind, is that the
first decision was issued per curiam and was even accompanied by a
concurring opinion that gave a second reason why a conviction under
section 6928(d)(1) did not require proof that the defendant knew the
receiving facility was unlicensed.
Individuals may be held criminally liable under [section] 6928(d)(1)
for unlawful transportation of hazardous waste even if they are unaware
that the transporter or receiving facility lacks the necessary permit
This interpretation of [section] 6928(d)(1), along with our holding
in Hoflin, leaves in place a comprehensive scheme of incentives that
matches the scope of regulation Congress intended for hazardous wastes
under RCRA. Those covered by RCRA's [section] 6928(d) must do
more than simply monitor their own conduct for compliance with permit
requirements. Individuals who trwansport or cause the transport of
regulated hazardous wastes must also verify that the receiving storage
facility has the required permit. Failure to do so is a violation of both
the language and purpose of RCRAY'
Despite the solid reasons cited in both the per curiam and concurring
opinions, the Ninth Circuit ordered the first Speach opinion withdrawn
on May 11, 1992. On June 29, it replaced that decision with the current
one, in which the former per curiam holding is relegated to a dissent
and the sound analysis of the concurrence is nowhere to be found, the
author apparently having decided he was wrong.
128. Hayes lnt'4 1992 WL 51181, at *2.
129. Id. at *3 (Pregerson, J., concurring specially).
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While room for disagreement may still exist on the issue of whether
a waste generator must know of his or a receiving facility's permit status,
circuit courts agree that a defendant does not have to know that the
waste he is mishandling is expressly defined as hazardous. The Eleventh
Circuit, in Hayes International, first decided this issue," and then
fleshed out that decision in United States v. Greer.Ul In Greer, the
court approved a jury instruction stating that, to be convicted, the
defendant only had to know "that the chemical waste had the potential
to be harmful to others or to the environment, and, in other words, it
was not an innocuous substance like water."' 2 The same jury instruc-
tion in Greer was also upheld by the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Hoflin.w Since that time, the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Dee'm and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. SellersM and United
States v. Baytank,m have also held that a defendant need not know
the substance in question was defined as a hazardous waste under RCRA.
B. Application of the RCO Doctrine to RCRA Violations
Finally, a trend is also developing that allows a modified version
of the RCO doctrine to be applied to public welfare statutes, such as
RCRA, even though they contain felony provisions requiring that a
defendant act "knowingly." Recent attempts by the DOJ to apply the
doctrine have been decried by some as "contrary to due process safeguards
intended to protect the innocent, as well as to RCRA's explicit lan-
guage."a 37 Nevertheless, no doubt exists whatsoever that the DOJ
will continue to use the RCO doctrine, based on its success to date.
In essence, the RCO doctrine makes corporate officers vicariously
liable for the commission of offenses by their subordinates, regardless
130. 786 F.2d at 1503.
131. 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cr.), reh'g denied en banc, 860 F.2d 1092 (1988).
132. Greer, 850 F.2d at 1450.
133. 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989).
134. 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
135. 926 F.2d 410, 415-416 (5th Cir. 1991).
136. 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991).
137. Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 97, at 10104.
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of whether the officers personally committed the violationsY1 The
theory behind the doctrine is that some statutes, such as those controlling
the processing of food, are so important to the public welfare that strict
liability must be imposed to protect a public that has no way of protecting
itself from violations. L" Little question exists that RCRA and other
environmental laws qualify as public welfare statutes."4
United States v. Johnson & Towers' is credited with first applying
the RCO doctrine to RCRA. In Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit
held that RCRA's criminal provisions applied to any corporate officer
who "knew or should have known that there had been no compliance
with the permit requirement,"' 42 and not just those with direct responsi-
bilities for waste disposal. Additionally, the court further lessened the
prosecution's burden by stating that such knowledge "may be inferred
by the jury as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible
positions with the corporate defendant," given the highly regulated nature
of the hazardous waste industry.'3
In effect, allowing this inference of knowledge from a defendant's
position extends the RCO doctrine to environmental felonies, even though
the doctrine as initially developed only applied to misdemeanor public
welfare statutes in which Congress intended to impose strict liability.'"
The result is obviously significant to any corporate official, no matter
how high, who has any authority over environmental compliance.
"Because knowledge may be inferred on the basis of the defendants'
position within the corporate structure, actual knowledge becomes
irrelevant. In other words, the mens rea requirement was almost read
out of the statute."'1
An analysis of the key Supreme Court case on the RCO doctrine,
United States v. Park,'" under the Johnson & Towers standard, illus-
138. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 97, at 882-83.
139. Id. at 872.
140. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (RCRA "is
undeniably a public welfare statute").
141. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
142. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665.
143. Id. at 670.
144. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 97, at 883-84.
145. Hogeland, supra note 2, at 120.
146. 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975).
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trates that little difference exists between the two cases. Park concerned
the conviction of the chief executive officer of a company with 36,000
employees for a violation of a strict liability misdemeanor statute
governing the proper storage of food. 47 Park had personally received
several notices of previous violations and had delegated the responsibility
of fixing the problem to another official.' In affuming the conviction,
the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary that Park know of
the violation charged, only that he had "by reason of his position in
the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first
instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that
he failed to do so." 49
Although the statute under which Park was charged was a strict liability
misdemeanor containing no knowledge requirement, had the same situation
arose concerning a RCRA violation, Park might well have been convicted
under Johnson & Towers despite RCRA's knowledge requirement. After
all, Park had been told a problem existed, even if he thought it had been
corrected and did not know of the exact incident that led to the charge.
Arguably, a jury could find all the elements necessary to convict a
defendant under the Johnson & Towers version of the RCO doctrine.
These elements include: (1) the RCRA violation occurred within the
defendant's area of authority; (2) the defendant had the authority to
prevent or correct the violation; and (3) the defendant knowingly failed
to prevent or correct the violation.m
For the jury to infer that a corporate officer had knowledge of the
violation he is alleged to have committed, the government must establish
that the officer was aware of a preexisting violation or potential violation.
Failure to act upon the violation he is charged with, despite this prior
notice, in conjunction with the first two factors set forth above, satisfies
the "knowing" requirement under section 6928(d) of RCRA.'51
Although in the Park situation, a RCRA defendant could claim that
by delegating responsibility he had acted on the notice of prior violations,
the prosecution could just as easily argue that the law required the
147. Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id. at 673-74.
150. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 97, at 884.
151. Id.
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defendant, by virtue of his position, to make sure that the problem had
indeed been corrected.
Subsequently, a growing list of circuit courts have also allowed juries
to infer that a corporate defendant knew of the violations from his position
of authority. The Eleventh Circuit in Hayes International held that:
"Transporters of waste presumedly are aware of [RCRA's] procedures,
and if a transporter does not follow the procedures, a juror may draw
certain inferences. Where there is no evidence that those who took
the waste asserted that they were properly licensed, the jurors may draw
additional inferences." 5 2 In Baytank, the Fifth Circuit held similarly
in reinstating the RCRA convictions of two corporate officials: "Given
the evidence of [the defendants'] detailed knowledge of and control
over the storage operations at Baytank, the jury was entitled to conclude
that they participated in the illegal storage.... "53
Perhaps the case that caused the most worry among corporate officials,
however, was United States v. Dee.'" Dee concerned the RCRA
convictions of three high-level civilian supervisors in the U.S. Army's
chemical weapons program for illegally storing hazardous wastes without
a permit. The case reportedly "sparked a panic among managers in
fields related to environmental compliance"'5 because two of the
defendants had no hands-on responsibilities for handling hazardous wastes,
although they admitted that they were aware of "storage problems" at
the facility.'5 In Dee, the court explicitly instructed the jury on
RCRA's knowledge requirement with language directly from the RCO
doctrine, stating:5
7
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining the
defendant's [sic] knowledge are their positions in the organization....
Thus you may, but need not, infer that a defendant knew facts which
you find that they [sic] should have known given their positions in the
152. United States v. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986).
153. United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 617 (5th Cir. 1991).
154. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
155. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 97, at 881.
156. Id. at 870.
157. Id. at 884-85.
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organization, their relationship to other employees, or any applicable
policies or regulation."
The court then stated the elements necessary for a conviction, elements
that unmistakably bear the stamp of the RCO doctrine:
First, that each defendant has a responsible relationship to the
violation. That is, that it occurred under his area of authority and
supervisory responsibility.
That each defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the
violation. That each defendant acted kowingly in failing to prevent,
detect or correct the violation.'"
Since Dee, only one other circuit court has expressly considered the
RCO doctrine as it applies to environmental violations. In United States
v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,"6 the First Circuit purported
to prohibit the prosecution from relying on the RCO doctrine in statutes
requiring knowing violations. 1 ' However, the instructions that the
First Circuit objected to differed considerably from those used in Dee.
"ITihe district court permitted the prosecution to constructively establish
defendant's knowledge if the jury found the following: (1) that the
defendant was a corporate officer, (2) with responsibility to supervise
the allegedly illegal activities; and (3) knew or believed 'that the illegal
activity of the type alleged occurred.'6 2
The third element in the MacDonald & Watson instruction allowed
the jury to convict without finding that the defendant knowingly failed
to correct the illegality charged; instead the jury only had to find that
the defendant knew previous incidents, similar to the one charged, had
occurred. The Dee instruction would not allow a conviction under that
circumstance. Therefore, it seems premature to proclaim, as some
conunentators have, that the First Circuit has actually prohibited applica-
158. Id. at 885.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
161. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
162. Id. at 52.
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tion of the RCO doctrine.16 That is especially true in light of the
fact that MacDonald & Watson approved of instructions allowing the
jury to infer the requisite knowledge from a corporate officer's "position
and responsibility."'"
IV. Conclusion
Although this author doubts many corporate executives aware of the
situation are in the mood to appreciate it, a certain irony exists in the
fact that during the last twelve years, while two extremely pro-business
presidents have controlled the Justice Department, federal criminal
prosecutors have declared war on environmental violations by corporations
and their officers. Even the generally sacrosanct Pentagon and its legion
of dependents, which usually find refuge from scrutiny of every sort
behind the cloak of national security, have taken casualties. Rockwell
International pleaded guilty to felony hazardous waste charges and paid
an $18.5 million fine after 120 armed federal agents conducted an early
morning raid at a federal nuclear weapons facility run by the huge defense
contractor.16" As yet, the grand jury has not handed down any indict-
ments of the individual officers of Rockwell.166
Although those corporations and executives targeted undoubtedly
feel otherwise, one can hardly quibble with such results when the John
Pozsgais, with their less lofty positions and correspondingly reduced
capabilities of severely damaging the environment, receive lengthy prison
terms. If this were seventeenth century France, Cardinal Richelieu,
as arbiter of public morality, would surely approve... unless, of course,
his responsibilities as virtual dictator happened to include overseeing
the servants who "treated, stored, or disposed of' the copious palace
wastes.
163. See Onsdorff and Mesnard, supra note 97, at 10103.
164. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
165. Rockwell Pleads Guilty, supra note 13.
166. Id.
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